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Abstract 
 
In this paper we evaluate mobile active authentication 
based on an ensemble of biometrics and behavior-based 
profiling signals. We consider seven different data channels 
and their combination. Touch dynamics (touch gestures 
and keystroking), accelerometer, gyroscope, WiFi, GPS 
location and app usage are all collected during human-
mobile interaction to authenticate the users. We evaluate 
two approaches: one-time authentication and active 
authentication. In one-time authentication, we employ the 
information of all channels available during one session. 
For active authentication we take advantage of mobile user 
behavior across multiple sessions by updating a confidence 
value of the authentication score. Our experiments are 
conducted on the semi-uncontrolled UMDAA-02 database. 
This database comprises smartphone sensor signals 
acquired during natural human-mobile interaction. Our 
results show that different traits can be complementary and 
multimodal systems clearly increase the performance with 
accuracies ranging from 82.2% to 97.1% depending on the 
authentication scenario. 
1. Introduction 
Services are migrating from the physical to the digital 
domain in the information society. Examples can be found 
in e-government, banking, education, health, commerce, 
and leisure. This digital revolution is associated with a 
massive deployment of mobile devices including multiple 
sensors (e.g. camera, gyroscope, GPS, touch screens, etc.), 
and full connectivity (e.g. bluetooth, WiFi, 4G, etc.). The 
mobile market has expanded to the point where the number 
of mobile devices in use is nearly equal to the world’s 
population. Mobile devices are rapidly becoming data hubs, 
used to store e-mail, personal photos, online history, 
passwords, and even payment information. Recent studies 
have shown that about 34% or more users did not use any 
form of authentication mechanism on their devices [1]. In 
similar studies, inconvenience is always shown to be one of 
the main reasons why users do not use any authentication 
mechanism. In [2], researchers showed that mobile device 
users spent up to 9% of the time they use their smartphone 
unlocking the screens, and the 2018 Meeker Report 
indicated that the average smartphone user checks his 
device 150 times per day. Those factors lead individuals to 
make less security conscious decisions like leaving their 
smartphones unprotected or just protecting them using 
simple to break authentication mechanisms (e.g., simple 
Google unlock graphical patterns vulnerable to over-the-
shoulder attacks [3]).  
Biometric technologies improve in several ways 
traditional recognition technologies based on passwords or 
swipe patterns. The advantages of biometric systems are 
many in terms of security and convenience of use, which 
has led these technologies to take on a leading role in the 
last years. In fact, there is a growing interest in the 
biometrics research community towards more transparent 
and robust authentication methods that make use of the 
interaction signals originated when using the smartphone 
[4][5]. Signals generated with the sensors already 
embedded in mobile devices (e.g., gyroscope, 
magnetometer, accelerometer, GPS, and touchscreen 
interactions) along with metadata associated to our use of 
the technology (e.g. internet point access, browsing history, 
app usage) could assist in user authentication avoiding the 
inconveniences of traditional unlocking systems. All this 
information is originated naturally during the normal usage 
of the user with a smartphone, and it has been demonstrated 
that can be used for person identification under certain 
conditions [5]. By regularly conducting unobtrusive 
identity checks of the mobile user during a normal session, 
a continuous authentication system can verify if the device 
is still being operated by the authorized user. With this 
active system, if the mobile device is stolen, it should 
quickly recognize the presence of an unauthorized user. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze multi-modal 
approaches to improve the performance of mobile 
authentication. Our experiments include up to four different 
biometric traits (touch gestures, keystroking, gyroscope, 
and accelerometer) and three behavioral-based profiling 
techniques (GPS, WiFi, and app usage). The experiments 
are conducted on the UMDAA-02 mobile database [6], a 
challenging dataset acquired under natural conditions. 
Previous works have demonstrated the potential of 
biometric and behavioral-based profiling patterns for user 
authentication under controlled scenarios. However, the 
performance of biometric mobile authentication based on 
human interaction raises doubt under challenging non-
supervised scenarios. The contributions of this work are: i) 
performance analysis of user authentication based on 4 
biometric data channels (touch gestures, keystroking, 
accelerometer, and gyroscope) and 3 behavior profiling 
MultiLock: Mobile Active Authentication based on  
Multiple Biometric and Behavioral Patterns   
 
Alejandro Acien, Aythami Morales, Ruben Vera-Rodriguez, and Julian Fierrez, Member IEEE 
Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, 28049 Spain 
{alejandro.acien, aythami.morales,ruben.vera, julian.fierrez}@uam.es 
 
 
  
2 
data sources (WiFi, GPS, and App usage), obtained during 
natural human-smartphone interaction; ii) study of 
multimodal approaches for smartphone user authentication 
based on various combinations of the previous 7 data 
channels, both for One-Time Authentication and for Active 
Authentication schemes (i.e., continuously over multiple 
sessions). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
links the present works with related research. Section 3 
describes the architecture of our approach. Section 4 
explains the experimental protocol, describing the database 
and the experiments performed. Section 5 presents the final 
results for single and multimodal architecture and Section 6 
summarizes the conclusions and future work. 
2. Related Work 
Mobile authentication based on soft biometrics traits has 
been deeply studied in the last years [7][8][9]. Swipe 
dynamics is one of the most popular traits analyzed [7]; 
however, it has been shown not to have enough 
discriminative power to replace traditional technologies. 
Accelerometer and gyroscope sensors have been studied 
traditionally for gait recognition, and some works have 
demonstrated also their utility for user authentication with 
acceptable performance [10]. 
Geo-location based verification approaches are scarce in 
the literature. In [11], Mahbub and Chellappa developed a 
mobile authentication system using trace histories by 
generating a confidence score of the new user location 
taking into account the sparseness of the geo-location data 
and past locations. For this purpose, they employed 
modified Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) considering the 
human mobility as a Markovian motion. In a similar way, 
in [12] a variation of HMMs was used to develop a user 
authentication mobile system by exploiting application 
usage data. They suggest that unforeseen events and 
unknown applications have more impact in the 
authentication performance than the most common apps 
used by the user. 
The potential of WiFi history data was analyzed in [8] 
for mobile authentication. They explored: i) the WiFi 
networks detected by the smartphone, ii) when the detection 
occurs, and iii) how frequently those networks are detected 
during a period of time. 
Regarding keystroke traits, in [9] a fixed-text 
keystroking system for mobile user authentication was 
studied using not only time and space based features (e.g. 
hold and flight times, jump angle or drag distance) but also 
studying the hands postures during typing as discriminative 
information. In [13], a novel fixed-text authentication 
system for laptops and mobile devices based on Partially 
Observable HMMs was studied. This model is an extension 
of HMMs in which the hidden state is conditioned on an 
independent Markov chain. The algorithm is motivated by 
the idea that typing events depend both on past events and 
also on a separate process. 
Finally, building a multimodal system that integrates all 
these heterogeneous information sources for mobile user 
authentication is still a challenge [14]. Noisy data, intra 
class variation or spoofing attacks [15] are some inevitable 
problems in unimodal systems that can be overcome by 
multimodal architectures [5][14]. In [16], a multimodal user 
authentication system was based on the fusion at decision 
level of voice, location, multi-touch, and accelerometer 
data. Their preliminary results suggest that these four 
modalities are suitable for continuous authentication. In 
[17], a fusion was performed also at decision level of 
behavioral-based profiling signals such as web browsing, 
application usage, and GPS location with keystroking data 
achieving 95% of user authentication accuracy using 
information from one-minute window. More recently, in 
[18] a fusion also at decision level of touch dynamics, 
power consumption, and physical movements modalities 
achieved 94.5% of accuracy with a dataset that was 
captured under supervised conditions. In [19], an 
unobtrusive mobile authentication application is designed 
for single and multimodal approaches. They collected data 
from WiFi, Bluetooth, accelerometer, and gyroscope 
sources in unsupervised conditions and fused them at score 
level achieving up to 90% of accuracy in the best scenario. 
Figure 1: System architecture. Continuous line corresponds to one-time authentication, and dotted line indicates add-on modules for 
active authentication. 
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3. System Description 
In this paper we analyze 4 biometric data channels (touch 
gestures, keystroking, gyroscope, and accelerometer) and 3 
behavior data sources (GPS, WiFi, and app usage). We 
study 2 architectures for user authentication (see Figure 1): 
the first approach (continuous line in Figure 1), referred to 
as One-Time Authentication (OTA) is based on unimodal 
systems trained with the information extracted from the 
mobile sensors during a user session. A session is defined 
as the elapsed period between the device unlock and the 
next lock. Therefore, sessions have a variable duration and 
information obtained from sensors varies depending on the 
usage of the device during the session. The information 
provided by the sensors is employed to model the user 
according to the seven systems mentioned before: 
keystroking, touch gestures, accelerometer, gyroscope, 
WiFi, app usage, and GPS location. Each system provides 
a single authentication score and these scores are combined 
to generate a unique score for each session. The second 
approach, called Active Authentication (dotted line in 
Figure 1), is based on updating a confidence value 
generated from the One-Time Authentication during 
consecutive sessions. 
The seven systems are categorized into two main groups 
according to the nature of the information employed to 
model the user: biometric and behavior-based profiling 
systems. In this work, biometric systems refer to the top 4 
channels in the Sensors Data module of Figure 1 (red box). 
The way we realize touch gestures, typing, or handle the 
device is determined by behavioral aspects (e.g. emotional 
state, attention) and neuromotor characteristics of users 
(e.g. ergonomic, muscles activation/deactivation timing, 
motor abilities). Behavioral-based profiling refers to those 
systems that model the owners of the device according to 
the services they use during their daily habits (orange box 
in Figure 1, bottom 3 channels in the Sensors Data module).  
3.1. Behavioral-based profiling systems 
WiFi, app usage, and GPS location system are based on 
a similar template-based matching algorithm. A user 
template is defined as a table containing the time stamps 
and the frequency of the events [8]. For this, we divided the 
time (24 hours of the day) into 𝑁 equal time slots (e.g. if we 
choose 𝑁 = 48 we will have 48 time slots of 30 minutes), 
giving to each time slot a number ID. Then we store in the 
template the event`s name, the number ID of the time slot 
and the occurrence frequency of that event (number of 
times this event occurs during this particular time slot on a 
window of consecutive days). Table 1 shows an example of 
the app-usage template for a given user generated according 
the data obtained during six days; in this case WhatsApp 
application is detected in the fourth slot for five days out of 
the six days considered meanwhile the same app is detected 
only one day in the fifth slot. Note that multiple detections 
of the same event in the same time slot and day are ignored 
but they are stored if they belong to different time slots or 
days. Depending on the system, the event could be the name 
of the WiFi network, latitude and longitude of a location 
(with two decimals of accuracy), or the name of a mobile 
app for WiFi, GPS location, and app usage systems, 
respectively. 
Finally, we test the systems by calculating a behavior-
based confidence score [8] for each test session as: 
 
  
where 𝑓𝑖 is the frequency of the event stored in the template 
that match with the test event 𝑖 in the same time slot and 𝑆 
is the total number of events detected in that test session. 
For example, if the test session includes the usage of 
WhatsApp and Navigator apps during the fourth slot, the 
score confidence will be  52 + 32=34 (according to the 
template showed in Table 1). Based on this, a higher score 
in the test session implies higher confidence for 
authentication.  
3.2. Biometric systems 
For touch gestures, keystroking, accelerometer and 
gyroscope systems, the feature extraction and classification 
algorithms are adapted to model the user information. In the 
touch gestures system, the feature set employed is a reduced 
set of the global features presented in [20] (commonly used 
for online handwriting sequence modeling) and adapted for 
swipe biometrics in [7]. Mean velocity, max acceleration, 
distance between adjacent points, or total duration are some 
examples of this subset of 28 features extracted (see [20] 
for details). 
For accelerometer and gyroscope, the data captured 
comprises x, y, and z coordinates of the inclination vector 
of the device (gyroscope) and the acceleration vector 
(accelerometer) in each time stamp. For these 2 sensors we 
use the feature set proposed in [10]: mean, median, 
maximum, minimum, distance between maximum and 
minimum, and the standard deviation for each array of 
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑓𝑖
2
𝑆
𝑖=1
  (1) 
TABLE 1: Example of an app-usage user template generated 
according the data captured during six days. 
 
Event Time slot Frequency 
WhatsApp 4 5 
Navigator 4 3 
YouTube 5 1 
WhatsApp 5 1 
Facebook 7 2 
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coordinates. Moreover, we propose the 1 and 99 percentiles 
and the distance between them as additional features. 
Regarding keystroking, the keys pressed were encrypted 
in order to ensure user-privacy so systems based on graphs 
were discarded and we adopted traditional timing features: 
hold time, press-press latency, and press-release latency as 
in [21][22]. Finally, we propose a feature set based on six 
statics (mean, median, standard deviation, 1 percentile, 99 
percentile, and 99-1 percentile). Note that UMDAA-02 
keystroke data can be considered as a free text scenario. 
However, the limited samples per session and the encrypted 
keys difficult the application of popular free-text keystroke 
authentication methods.  
For classification we train different Support Vector 
Machines (SVM) with a radial basis function (RBF) kernel, 
one for each feature set and user with an optimization of 
both hyperparameters (𝐶, 𝜎). 
4. Experiments 
4.1. Database 
The experiments were conducted with UMDAA-02 
database [6]. This database comprises 141.14 GB of 
smartphone sensor signals collected from 48 Maryland 
University students over a period of 2 months, the 
participants used a smartphone provided by the researchers 
as their primary device during their daily life (unsupervised 
scenario). The sensors captured are touchscreen (i.e. touch 
gestures and keystroking), gyroscope, accelerometer, 
magnetometer, light sensor, GPS, and WiFi, among others. 
Information related to mobile user´s behavior like lock and 
unlock time events, start and end time stamps of calls and 
app usage are also stored. 
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of the database. 
During a session, the data collection application stored the 
information provided by the sensors in use. 
4.2. Experimental Protocol 
The experiments are divided into two different scenarios: 
One-Time Authentication (OTA) and Active 
Authentication (AA). In OTA the performance is calculated 
using only one session to authenticate the user meanwhile 
in AA we employ multiple consecutive sessions in order to 
improve the confidence in the authentication. 
For all experiments the dataset is divided into 60% days 
for training (first sessions) and the remaining 40% days for 
testing. This means that we employ six days in average to 
model the user and 4 days in average to test such a model.  
The performance for both scenarios is presented in terms of 
average correct classification rate computed as 100−EER 
(Equal Error Rate). EER refers to the value where False 
Acceptance Rate (percentage of impostors classified as 
genuine) and False Rejection Rate (percentage of genuine 
users classified as impostors) are equal. 
 
4.2.1. One-Time Authentication. In OTA experiments, 
all 7 systems are trained separately for each user and the 
scores are calculated at session level, generating 7 scores 
for each test session as maximum (note that the number of 
systems available during a session varies). The 4 biometric 
systems considered can produce more than one score per 
session (e.g. multiple gestures or multiple keystroking 
sequences during a text chat). In those cases, the scores 
available during the session are averaged to obtain one 
score for each biometric system and session. Finally, we 
normalize with 𝑡𝑎𝑛ℎ  normalization and fuse the scores 
(mean rule) to calculate a single score [14] according to the 
different fusion set-ups proposed. The scores from the best 
fusion set-up will be used in the AA scenario.  
 
4.2.2. Active Authentication.  For AA experiments we 
consider the QCD algorithm (Quickest Change Detection) 
as explained in [23]. The QCD-based algorithm updates a 
confidence score based on previous events (sessions in this 
work) by performing a cumulative sum of scores. This 
cumulative sum will be almost zero if the scores belong to 
the genuine user, and will grow if an impostor takes the 
control, until it reaches a certain threshold that would detect 
the intruder. The cumulative sum is calculated as follow: 
 
 
where 𝑗  means the actual session and 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗−1
𝐴𝐴  is the 
previous cumulative score. 𝐿𝑗  is the contribution of the 
actual session calculated as the log-likelihood ratio between 
score distributions: 
 
𝐿𝑗 = log (
𝑓𝐼(𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗)
𝑓𝐺(𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗)
) (3) 
 
where 𝑓𝐺   and  𝑓𝐼  are the probability distributions of the 
genuine and impostor scores respectively calculated 
previously in the OTA fusion scenario, and 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗  is the 
OTA fused score of the actual session. According to (3), the 
log-likelihood ratio 𝐿𝑗 will be negative if  𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗 belongs to 
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗
𝐴𝐴 = max (𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗−1
𝐴𝐴 + 𝐿𝑗 , 0) (2) 
TABLE 2: General UMDAA-02 dataset information. 
 
Description Statistics 
Gender  36M/12F 
Age  22-31 years 
Avg. Days/User 10 days 
Avg. Sessions/User 248 sessions 
Avg. Time/Session 224 seconds 
Avg. Systems/Session 5.2 systems* 
*Systems: refers to the number of systems available out 
of the 7 studied in this work. 
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a genuine user and positive in the opposite case and, 
therefore, multiple consecutive sessions of an impostor in 
control will increase the cumulative sum (𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗
𝐴𝐴). 
 Figure 2 depicts an example of 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗
𝐴𝐴  evolution. At 
the time the mobile starts to be operated by an intruder 
(session number sixteen in Figure 2) the 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗
𝐴𝐴  (𝑗 > 16)  
will tend to increase until reaching the threshold. The time 
elapsed between the intrusion start and the intrusion 
detection is known as Detection Delay (DD) measured in 
number of sessions.  
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1. One-Time Authentication 
In this section we analyze the OTA scenario: the 
accuracy for the 4 biometric systems and the fusion with 
each behavior-based profiling system. Table 3 summarizes 
the final results by ranking from the best individual 
biometric system performance to the worst one. The first 
column shows the performance obtained for each single 
biometric system. From the second to the fourth column, 
we show the performance for the fusion of each biometric 
system with each behavior-based profiling system, and the 
fifth column shows the fusion with all of them. 
 First of all, the poor performance achieved by some 
biometric systems can be caused by the uncontrolled 
acquisition conditions of the database and the limited 
number of samples per session (e.g. free text keystroke 
usually requires large sequences) but the combination of all 
of them (last row in Table 3) shows acceptable performance 
for unsupervised scenarios. 
Secondly, we can observe that behavior-based profiling 
systems always improve biometric systems performances 
in all fusion schemes.  In fact, the combination of all 
behavior-based profiling approaches with each biometric 
system achieves the most competitive performance, 
improving them in more than 18% of accuracy in the best 
of cases. If we analyze each single behavior-based profiling 
fusion, we can observe that the GPS system achieves the 
best improvements, boosting biometric systems 
performances in more than 13% of accuracy. 
Finally, in Figure 3 we plot the ROC curves for each 
single biometric system and the best fusion set-up: the 
fusion of all behavior-based profiling systems with each 
biometric system (column 5 in Table 3). The results in OTA 
scenario suggest that behavior-based profiling systems 
always improve the biometric ones and the best 
performance is achieved by fusing with all of them, and 
therefore, the scores obtained from this fusion scheme will 
be use in AA scenario. 
5.2. Active Authentication 
First some definitions: 
Probability of False Detections (PFD): is the percentage 
of genuine users detected as intruder during a sequence of 
genuine sessions. It means that 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗
𝐴𝐴  reaches the 
intruder detection threshold during a genuine session 
sequence (genuine curve in Figure 2). PFD is similar to 
FMR (False Match Rate) in one-time authentication. 
Probability of Non-Detection (PND): is the percentage 
of intruders not detected during a sequence of intruder 
sessions. It means that 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗
𝐴𝐴 does not reach the intruder 
detection threshold during the intruder sessions sequence 
(impostor curve in Figure 2). PND is similar to FNMR 
(False Non-Match rate) in one-time authentication. 
Average Detection Delay (ADD): is the average number 
of impostor sessions needed to detect an intruder (the grey 
box in Figure 2).  
TABLE 3: Results achieved for both One-Time and Active Authentication (AA) scenarios in terms of correct classification rate (%) 
according to different number of biometric systems and their fusion with behavior-based profiling systems. In brackets, average 
number of sessions employed (ADD).  
 
System Acc. +WiFi +GPS +AppUsage All AA 
Touch gestures 72.0 78.2 78.3 75.4 83.1  95.0 (6) 
Keystroking 62.5 72.6 70.9 67.8 79.1 92.9 (7) 
Accelerometer 61.3 70.8 77.3 64.7 78.7 93.7 (7) 
Gyroscope 59.5 69.7 72.6 63.4 78.4 92.3 (6) 
Combined 73.2 77.3 78.9 75.3 82.2 97.1 (5) 
 
Figure 2: An example of QCD-based curve with a sequence of 
30 sessions (15 genuine and 15 impostors). The dashed line is 
the intruder detection threshold and the grey box shows the 
Detection Delay (DD). 
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To calculate the correct classification rate in AA we plot 
in Figure 4 the PND vs. PFD and ADD vs. PFD curves. The 
PND-PFD curves are similar to FMR-FNMR curve in one-
time authentication with the main difference that those 
results are obtained from a sequence of stacked scores 
instead of only one. The equal error rate (EER) will be the 
value where PND and PFD are equal and the correct 
classification rate will be computed as 100 − EER. The 
ADD-PFD curve shows the number of sessions needed to 
detect an intruder according to the PFD. This curve allows 
us to know how many sessions are needed to achieve the 
EER reported. For instance, the PND-PFD curves in Figure 
4 (right) show that the EER in Active Authentication is 
2.9% and the ADD to achieve that EER is 5 sessions. This 
means that we can improve OTA results at the cost of 
having more sessions to detect an intruder. All curves were 
calculated for each user and averaged. 
 Finally, all AA results are summarized in the last column 
of Table 3. Remember that scores employed in the QCD-
based algorithm come from the fusion scores of the best 
OTA scenario (fusing with all behavior-based profiling 
systems) so both performances are correlated. Each 
performance in Table 3 for AA is followed by the average 
detection delay in brackets needed to achieve it. As we  
expected, in all different fusion set-ups the AA algorithm 
improves the accuracy at the cost of needing more sessions 
to detect the intruder. In fact, for the best fusion set-up the 
performance improves from 82.2% to 97.1% by using 5 
consecutive intruder sessions to detect the impostor. 
Comparing all scenarios, the greatest improvement occurs 
with all biometric systems combined (14.9% of 
improvement in the last row of Table 3) with an average 5 
sessions. 
6. Conclusions and Future Work  
In this paper, we have studied user mobile active 
authentication based on multiple biometric and behavior-
based profiling systems. For this, we studied two scenarios 
according to the number of sessions used: one session (One-
Time Authentication) and multiple sessions (Active 
Authentication). The results suggest that some biometric 
systems work better than others, and that the fusion with 
behavior-based profiling systems always improves the 
results, achieving accuracies up to 82.2% in the best case 
for an OTA scenario. Our experiments also suggest that 
Active Authentication always improve the accuracies with 
up to 14% of enhancement with respect to One-Time 
Authentication using between 5 and 7 sessions. 
For future works we will work to improve the 
performance of individual systems, especially biometrics 
systems. Better individual performances will produce better 
fused schemes. The combination of heterogeneous data at 
data and feature level will be evaluated in order to merge 
correlations between systems (e.g. touch gestures and apps 
used are highly correlated).  
Figure 4: PND vs PFD curves of active authentication for the best fusion schemes (left), PND vs PFD and ADD vs PFD curves for 
the best fusion set-up (right). The dark dashed line shows the EER and the red one shows the Average Detection Delay for that EER 
in the right plot. 
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